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When processing negative sentences without context, participants often represent states 
of the positive arguments. Why and when does this occur? Using visual world eye-
tracking, participants listened to positive and negative sentences in simple or cleft forms 
(e.g. [It is] Matt [who] hasn’t shut his dad’s window), while looking at scenes 
containing a target and a competitor (matches or mismatches the implied shape of the 
final noun). Results show that in the simple but not the cleft condition, there is a 
difference between negatives and positives: shortly after the verb, there is more looks to 
the competitor in the simple negatives than the positives. This suggests that the 
representation of the positive is not a mandatory first step of negation processing (as per 
rejection accounts). Rather results support the Question Under Discussion (QUD) 
accommodation account wherein both sentence content and contextual source of 
relevance are targets of incremental sentence processing. 







In research on negative sentence processing, across a range of different paradigms, 
results very often point to the conclusion that participants represent the positive 
argument of negation while performing reading or verification tasks, especially in the 
early stages of processing. For a sentence like, “The banana is not peeled”, the positive 
argument of negation would be that the banana is peeled1. Specifically, responses in 
sentence verification tasks (Clark & Chase, 1972; Carpenter & Just, 1975; Dale & 
Duran, 2011), probe recognition tasks (Kaup, Yaxley, Madden, Zwaan, & Lüdtke, 
2007; Lüdtke & Kaup, 2006, (Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006) and ERP studies (Fischler, 
Bloom, Childers, Roucos, & Perry, 1983; Lüdtke, Friedrich, De Filippis, & Kaup, 2008) 
strongly suggest that a representation of the positive argument of negation is employed 
in the process.  
In sentence verification research, many studies show a polarity by truth-value 
interaction in response times. Clark and Chase (1972) asked participants to verify 
affirmative or negative sentences against pictures. For example, against a picture of a 
plus above a star, the sentences come in four conditions:  
TA (True Affirmative): The plus is above the star.  
FA (False Affirmative): The star is above the plus.  
TN (True Negative): The star isn’t above the plus.  
FN (False Negative) : The plus isn’t above the star. 
They found that while for affirmative sentences, true sentence-picture pairs are 
faster than false sentence-picture pairs (TA < FA), the opposite is true for negative 
sentences (TN > FN). This pattern is interpreted in terms of a strategy based on the 
truth-functional property of negation: a negative sentence has the opposite truth-value of 
its positive counterpart. When presented with a negative sentence, participants first 
represent and evaluate the truth value of its positive argument (the corresponding 
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affirmative), and then reverse the truth value. Given that response latencies are greater 
for FAs than TAs, it explains why TNs have longer response latencies than FNs. Dale 
and Duran (2011, experiment 1) conducted a sentence-world knowledge verification 
study using mouse-tracking (“Elephants are not small/large”) and found a similar 
pattern. 
Beyond sentence verification, in a series of studies using visual probe 
recognition, Kaup and colleagues established that at a short latency (250ms), 
participants are faster to respond to an image consistent with the positive argument of a 
negative sentence than an image consistent with the negative sentence itself (Kaup, 
Zwaan, & Lüdtke, 2007). Thus, having read, “The bird was not in the air”, participants 
responded faster to an image of a flying bird than one of a bird at rest. At longer 
latencies (1500ms), the pattern has been found to be reversed (Kaup, Zwaan, & Lüdtke, 
2006). In ERP studies, Fischler et al. (1983) found that certain kinds of TNs (e.g. “A 
robin is not a tree”) give rise to greater N400 effects than corresponding FNs (e.g. “A 
robin is not a bird”), while the corresponding FAs predictably give rise to an N400 
effect relative to TAs. Fischler et al. (1983) attribute this reversal of the normal N400 
effect to the fact that participants first process the positive argument of negation.  
Lüdtke et al. (2008) measured ERPs when participants had to verify sentences such as 
“In the front of the tower there is a/no ghost” against a matching or mismatching picture 
presented 250ms or 1500ms after the sentence. They found that at 250ms ISI, pictures 
that match the positive argument (e.g. a ghost in front of a tower) are primed equally by 
both positive and negative sentences. However, at 1500ms, pictures that match the 
positive argument were less primed than pictures that were consistent with the sentence 
meaning in the negative condition. They concluded that a negative sentence is processed 
by first simulating the positive argument. Negation is only integrated into the sentence 
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meaning at a later point. Hasson and Glucksberg (2006) studied the processing of 
negative metaphors. They found that 150ms or 500ms after reading a negative sentence 
like “this lawyer is not a shark”, participants were faster at making a lexical decision on 
a probe related to the positive counterpart (vicious) than one that is related to the 
negative sentence meaning (gentle). At 1000ms, the pattern is reversed. They conclude 
that negations are initially represented as their positive counterpart, and it takes between 
500ms and 1000ms to arrive at the negation-consistent meaning.  
While it seems that participants do sometimes represent the positive argument 
during various tasks in these studies, many studies suggest that they do not always. In 
the sentence verification literature, a second commonly reported pattern of results is a 
main effect of both polarity and truth-value, i.e. for both affirmative and negative 
sentences, true sentence-picture pairs are faster to verify than false sentence-picture 
pairs (Arroyo, 1982; Trabasso & Rollins, 1971). This pattern is widely interpreted as 
being due to participants inferring what would make the negative sentence true (e.g. the 
situation of an open door for “The door is not closed”) and checking that the image is 
consistent with this. Thus true sentences are verified faster, regardless of their polarity. 
In the ERP literature, Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008) show that contextually 
felicitous TNs (e.g. “With proper equipment, scuba-diving isn’t very dangerous and 
often good fun.”) do not give rise to an N400 effect compared to either TAs (“With 
proper equipment, scuba-diving is very safe and often good fun.”) or FNs (“With proper 
equipment, scuba-diving isn’t very safe and often good fun.”). Similarly, Dale and 
Duran (2011, Experiment 2&3) indicate that the more contextual support the negative 
sentences have, the less the tendency there is to consider the positive argument. Several 
fMRI studies on negation (Tettamanti et al., 2008; Tomasino, Weiss, & Fink, 2010) 
found no evidence of the representation of the positive argument during negative 
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sentence processing. Tettamanti et al. (2008) show that while reading a positive 
sentence with action verbs (e.g. “grip”, “clasp”) activates the motor brain regions, 
negation modulates this activity. Specifically, negative phrases tend to show decreased 
activation relative to their positive counterparts. Finally, following on from Kaup et al. 
(2007), Tian, Breheny and Ferguson (2010) show that when we change the negative 
sentence form but not the propositional content, participants no longer show a response 
advantage for the picture that is consistent with the positive counterpart. Here, 250ms 
after the presentation of a simple negative sentence (e.g. “John hasn’t ironed his shirt”), 
participants responded faster to a picture that is consistent with the positive argument of 
negation (an ironed shirt), but that 250ms after the presentation of a cleft negative 
sentence (e.g. “It is John who hasn’t ironed his shirt”), participants responded faster to a 
picture that is consistent with the negative argument (a crumpled shirt). Tian et al. argue 
that the change of linguistic form to a cleft sentence causes a change of accommodated 
context. 
Why is the positive argument often represented during negation processing? The 
literature offers two perspectives: rejection-based accounts and contextual views. The 
first perspective draws on the analysis of negation as an external truth-functional 
operator. Negation reverses the truth value of its embedded proposition. Based on this 
function, some theories state that a negative sentence is represented by multiple 
constituents, namely the negation operator and its positive argument. In the course of 
sentence comprehension or verification, participants first represent the embedded 
argument, and then reject it or reverse its truth value. Both propositional theories (Clark 
& Chase, 1972; Carpenter & Just, 1975), and the two-step simulation approach (Kaup, 
Zwaan, et al., 2007) follow the idea of “rejection”, although they differ in how the 
constituents are represented. These theories explain why the positive argument is 
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activated in the first place and that this is the cause of the extra difficulty of negation 
which is often reported in the psycholinguistics literature. They also claim that 
processing is initially insensitive to negation. By contrast, the second perspective, 
stemming from Wason (1965), suggests that with the right kind of contextual support, 
negative sentences are not difficult. In this tradition, Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008) 
suggest that, with the right contextual support, the positive argument need not be 
represented for comprehension. Similar conclusions are drawn in Dale and Duran 
(2011). Contextual views explain why the positive argument is sometimes not activated 
when negative sentences have contextual support. 
What seems to be missing from the contextualist perspective is an explicit 
account of the mechanism of context projection that can also explain why the positive 
argument is sometimes represented when we process negative sentences. This is 
provided by the dynamic pragmatic account: the positive argument is represented due to 
QUD accommodation (Tian et al., 2010; Tian & Breheny, 2015). 
Current approaches to natural language interpretation are dynamic – assuming 
that language use functions to update an information state. In language use, information 
states contain background information relevant to resolve presuppositions (Stalnaker 
1978; Clark 1996) and also information that bears on how the utterance is meant to be 
relevant (Grice 1989; Sperber & Wilson 1986). Current dynamic accounts describe the 
source of relevance of an utterance in terms of a set of salient Questions Under 
Discussion (QUDs - Ginzburg 2012; Roberts 2012). The linguistic form of a sentence 
contains cues (e.g. prosodic focus) for the intended QUD (Ginzburg, 2012; Roberts, 
2012). When contextual information is implicit or absent, we use these cues to retrieve 
and accommodate the likely source of relevance, or QUD, addressed by the current 
sentence (ibid). Tian et al. (2010) argue that negation is a cue for the prominent QUD. 
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Without context or further cues, the most prominent QUD for a negative sentence “not 
p” is the positive question whether p. The prominence of this positive QUD comes from 
the most frequent use of negation: denial and rejection (Tottie, 1991). When processed 
out of context, negation often triggers the participants to accommodate a positive QUD. 
For example, for a simple negative sentence such as “John hasn’t ironed his shirt”, its 
most prominent QUD is whether the positive counterpart is true, namely, whether John 
has ironed his shirt. We argue that it is QUD accommodation that accounts for why 
studies often report the representation of content consistent with the positive counterpart 
when processing a negative sentence, as most studies presented participants with 
sentences without context.  However, if the linguistic form of a negative sentence points 
to a negative QUD, participants should no longer represent the positive argument. For 
example, for a cleft negative sentence “It is John who hasn’t ironed his shirt”, the most 
prominent QUD is who hasn’t ironed their shirt. In this case, comprehenders do not 
first activate the representation of an ironed shirt. The pattern of results from Tian et al. 
(2010) who used stimuli such as these is described above and it cannot easily be 
accounted for using a rejection-based model since in both conditions the same negative 
proposition is expressed. The results are predicted by our QUD accommodation 
account. 
When does QUD accommodation occur? Given that after reading simple 
negative sentences participants respond faster to the positive image, results in Tian et al 
(2010) might suggest that the likely source of relevance (QUD) is inferred before the 
proposition expressed is represented, akin to a two-step process. However, we argue 
that dynamic updating processes are fully incremental and interactive. I.e. inferences 
about both the likely QUD and the likely content are processed incrementally as 
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linguistic input proceeds – with inferences about one influencing inferences about the 
other.  
Language processing is incremental and predictive, evidenced by that fact that 
we can often interact with each other with no gap between conversational turns 
(Heldner & Edlund, 2010; Stivers et al., 2009). These properties apply not only to the 
processing of sentence content, but also to the integration of contextual information. 
Altmann and Steedman (1988) demonstrates that inferences about how to satisfy the 
presuppositions of a definite description in a visual context are processed at the same 
time as – and in turn influences- the computation of inferences about syntactic 
attachment. Thus we believe that inferences about the likely QUD and  the sentence 
content are processed in parallel. For the items in Tian et al. (2010), we believe the time 
course of inferring negative content was later than for positive QUDs due to the extra 
cost of inferring the negative state of affairs from the linguistic stimulus alone. I.e. for, 
“The shirt is not ironed”, the linguistic stimulus itself provides information about the 
positive state of affairs, while the negative state of affairs (being crumpled) needs to be 
inferred on the basis of world knowledge that can be activated only after processing the 
predicate. Our visual world study is set up to eliminate this disadvantage for inferring 
the negative state of affairs by providing images consistent with both positive and 
negative states of affairs, available for 1s before the onset of the linguistic input. 
According to the incremental QUD accommodation account, we predict that the time-
course of representing QUDs and content should be comparable in these cases where 
either is positive or negative. 
The Current Study 
The current study investigates when contextual accommodation occurs, and at what 
point the meaning of negation is incorporated. We compare the time course of 
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representations during the processing of positive and negative sentences, using a visual 
world eye-tracking paradigm. Prior studies in visual world eye-tracking (Cooper, 1974; 
Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995) found that even without any 
task other than reading for comprehension, participants shift their visual attention 
around the scene as the linguistic stimuli unfold. Altmann and colleagues (Altmann & 
Kamide, 1999; Altmann & Kamide, 2007) found that language-mediated eye 
movements are anticipatory, and they correspond to a dynamically changing 
representation of events. Altmann et al. (2007) presented participants with semi-realistic 
visual scenes such as a man standing next to table with an empty wine glass, a full beer 
glass and some distractors, while listening to a sentence such as “the man will drink all 
of the beer” or “the man has drunk all of the wine”. In this “look and listen” task, they 
found that participants shifted their visual attention to the full beer glass or empty wine 
glass before the onset of the critical noun “beer” or “wine”. This shows that participants 
incrementally update their representation of events by combining linguistic and visual 
information. 
The look-and-listen paradigm provides us with a tool to study the time course of 
the processing of negative sentences compared to their positive counterparts. As in Tian 
et al. (2010) participants hear positive and negative versions of a sentence in simple, (1), 
and clefted (2) formats: 
1a) John has ironed his brother’s shirt. (simple positive) 
1b) John hasn’t ironed his brother’s shirt. (simple negative) 
2a) It is John who has ironed his brother’s shirt. (cleft positive) 
2b) It is John who hasn’t ironed his brother’s shirt. (cleft negative) 
Positive sentences like 1a) and 2a) imply that the current state of the shirt is 
smooth, while their negative versions 1b) and 2b) imply that the shirt is crumpled. 
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Following Altmann and Kamide (2007), in our study, participants hear sentences while 
looking at a visual scene containing the representation of the implied state (the target) 
and the representation of the opposite state (the competitor). According to rejection 
accounts, both simple and cleft negatives (1b and 2b) should be processed by first 
representing the positive argument (John has ironed his brother’s shirt), thus predicting 
a delay in 1b) relative to 1a), and similarly in 2b) relative to 2a). For both negative 
sentences, attention should first be directed to the representation of the positive 
argument (competitor), before being shifted to the target.  
By contrast, the incremental QUD accommodation account claims that 
participants will incrementally update predictions about content and QUD in parallel. 
As established in Tian et al., (2010), without further context, both simple positive and 
negative sentences of the form, “NP1 has/hasn’t V NP2” are liable to be associated with 
a QUD about the positive state of affairs, “whether NP1 has V-ed NP2”.  For the items 
in 1a) and 1b), given a visual context showing a shirt in a crumpled state and a shirt in a 
smooth state, participants ought to start predicting both sentence content and sentence 
QUD from the offset of the verb. For subject-clefted sentences (“It was NP who 
has/hasn’t V NP”), our assumption is that the most likely QUD is of the form, who/what 
has/hasn’t V NP, based on the presupposition of the sentence, someone/something 
has/hasn’t V NP. Therefore, in incremental processing, by the offset of the auxiliary 
“has”/ “hasn’t”, participants should have established the syntactic form as a subject-
clefted sentence, and thus be able to anticipate the general form of both the 
presupposition and the QUD. By the verb “ironed”, given the visual context, 
participants ought to be able to anticipate both the QUD for the sentence and its content. 
Thus, for all of the items in the simple and cleft conditions of this experiment, 
participants are expected to be able to predict both content and QUD from the same 
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point in the linguistic stimulus. Thus we predict that in the simple negative, (1b), 
participants will look at both the negative target and its positive competitor before 
focusing on the content of the assertion. In contrast, since content and QUD are both 
positive for the 1a), we predict a rapid bias to the positive target. For the clefted version 
of the propositions (2a and 2b), we predict little or no delay of the negative with respect 
to the positive. This is so since for both positive and negative cleft sentences, the likely 
QUD is of the same polarity as the content. For the positive (2a), the prominent QUD is 
who ironed their brother’s shirt, while for the negative (2b) it is who did not iron their 
brother’s shirt.  
While clefted items are predicted to give rise to a target bias in the same time 
course as each other, we do not predict that bias to target will form in the same time 
course as in the simple positive. This is so since the clefted form is less frequent than 
the simple form and it is linguistically and pragmatically more complex. In particular, 
the presupposition of the cleft construction tends to suggest a more complex situation 
than is suggested for the simple assertions: one which involves people other than John 
and his brother and also multiple shirts. Other things equal, such situational background 
would take more resources to construct (cf Altmann & Steedman, 1988). In addition the 
presupposition or QUD of the sentence would typically give rise to a conversational 
implicature 2 that the predicate does not hold for others in the context. That is, for (2a) it 
may be inferred as background information that others did not iron their brother’s shirt 
and for (2b) that someone did iron their brother’s shirt. To the extent that these 
implicatures are accessed in the same time course as sentence content (Grodner et al.,  
2010; Breheny, Ferguson, & Katsos, 2013) we should see a diminution of the rate of 





Thirty-six participants between the age of 19 and 36 were recruited from University 
College London via an online psychological subject pool, 20 were female. They 
participated either for course credit or £4. All participants speak English as a native 
language. They have uncorrected or corrected to normal vision. 
Materials 
This experiment has a two by two within participants design. The two independent 
variables are polarity and cleft-ness. These two variables generate four experimental 
conditions: simple positive, simple negative, cleft positive and cleft negative. 40 
experimental items were constructed (see Table 1 for examples). All predicates of 
experimental sentences described bi-polar states of the same object, such as “iron the 
shirt” (the shirt is either ironed or not) and “turn on the TV” (the TV is either on or off). 
Thus, positive and negative versions of the predicate each imply a unique state, which is 
supported by the available visual context (depicting these two alternate states). 
 Experimental sentences are of the form of “(It is) Name (who) has/hasn’t verb his/her 
someone’s noun”. For example, “Matt hasn’t shut his dad’s window” (simple) or “It is 
Matt who hasn’t shut his dad’s window” (cleft). Note that we added words such as “his 
dad’s”4 in between the verb and target noun, because previous studies (Altmann & 
Kamide, 2007 experiment 1; Barr, 2008a) have demonstrated the need to allow 
participants more time to anticipate referents before bottom-up information is available.  
Each experimental item generates four sentences, and four lists are created, each 
containing 40 experimental sentences.  Each item only appears once in each list, in one 
of the four conditions, using a Latin-square design. In addition, there are 40 fillers, 
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among which half were positive, and half were negative. Half indicate the beginning 
state of an event (will and should have), while the other half indicate the end state of an 
event (shouldn’t have). After 20 sentences (10 experimental), there was a 
comprehension question. The aim was to check whether the participants understood the 
content of the sentence. For example, for the filler “Tom has fixed his uncle’s fridge”, 
the question was “is Tom’s uncle’s fridge still broken?”.  Each participant heard 80 
sentences in total (see Table 1 for examples). 
(Table 1 about here). 
Sentences were recorded by a male speaker of Southeast British English. The 
speaker was instructed to read all sentences with a natural intonation, while putting a 
stress on "has" or "hasn't" for simple sentences, and on the name (e.g. John) for cleft 
sentences. Note that in cleft sentences, "hasn't" received a secondary stress, but "has" 
did not. This was not instructed.  
Each experimental item and each filler sentence is paired with a visual scene 
consisting of five items: a person (which matches the gender of the name), two critical 
images and two distractors. The two critical images include a target and a competitor. 
The target represents the implied state of the item, while the competitor represents the 
opposite state. For example, for the sentence “Matt hasn’t shut his dad’s window”, the 
target is an open window and the competitor is a shut window. The target for a negative 
sentence is the competitor for the positive counterpart. The two distractors are images of 
a different item in two states (for example a plain bagel and a bagel with cream cheese), 
so that participants will not be able to predict the verb before hearing it. All pictures of 
the person measure 150*250 pixels. All pictures of four items measure 250*250 pixels. 
The screen resolution is 1024*768 pixels. The picture of the person is always in the 
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centre of the screen. Target, competitor and two distractors are located in the four 
corners of the screen but the exact location of each is counterbalanced. 
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted using E-Prime software and a Tobii X60 eye-tracker. 
Participants were calibrated at the beginning of the experiment using a nine-point 
display. Head movements were not restricted but participants were asked to stay still as 
much as possible throughout the duration of the experiment. Before each trial, there was 
a fixation cross in the centre of the screen, and participants' eye gaze had to be fixed on 
this point for a continuous 3 seconds before the trial started. Then a scene with five 
images (as described above) appeared on the screen. Participants had one second to 
preview the images, and the audio stimuli started after the preview. During the audio, 
the participants were instructed to simply listen and look at the images. The sentences 
last an average of 3.04 seconds (standard deviation 0.37 seconds, minimum length 2.31 
seconds, maximum length 4.35 seconds). Eye movements were recorded for 6 seconds 
for each trial. For 20 out of 80 sentences, a comprehension question appeared on the 
screen after the sentence, and participants pressed either the "yes" or "no" key to answer 
the question (they are 1 and 0, with stickers which says "yes" or "no"). The whole 
experiment lasted approximately 25 minutes. 
Data Analysis and Results 
Analysis of audio stimuli  
The onset and offset for each word in the experimental audios are hand marked using 
phonetics analysis software Praat (Boersma & Weenink, 2013) with a millisecond 
resolution. For the analysis, we are interested in the main verb, post-verb silence5, 
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possessive pronouns ("his" or "her"), second possessive, such as "brother's" or 
"friend's", and the final noun. Table 2 shows the mean and standard deviation of 
duration for each of these words in milliseconds. 
(Table 2 about here).  
Between positive and negative simple sentences, there is no significant 
difference in the duration of the verb (t = 0.34, p = 0.74), "his"/"her" (t = 0.16, p = 
0.87), “someone's” (t = 1.96, p = 0.06), or the noun (t = 1.83, p = 0.07). There is a 
significant difference in the duration of the post-verb silence (t = 2.98, p = 0.02). 
Between positive and negative cleft sentences, there is no significant difference in the 
duration of "his"/"her" (t = 0.17, p = 0.87), or "someone's" (t = 0.22, p = 0.83). There is 
a small but significant difference in the duration of the verb (t = 2.65, p = 0.01; negative 
> positive), in post-verb silence (t = 0.25, p = 0.02; negative > positive), and in noun (t 
= 0.25, p = 0.01; negative > positive). Overall the durations of verb-to-noun window 
should be comparable between simple positives and negatives, and between cleft 
positives and negatives (overall differences at 1.4% of the verb to noun window for 
simple conditions, and at 5% for cleft conditions). Therefore to compare simple 
positives with simple negatives, and to compare cleft positives with cleft negatives, we 
decided to analyse both averages within word regions, and averages during every 100ms 
time slices in a 1000ms time window.  
Comparing simple and cleft sentences, there is no significant difference in the 
duration of "his"/"her" (t = 1.35, p = 0.18), “someone's” (t = 1.94, p = 0.06), or the noun 
region (t = 0.21, p = 0.84). There is a significant difference in the duration of verb (t = -
6.23, p < 0.001). On average the verbs in simple sentences are 49 ms longer than cleft. 
Post-verb silence in simple sentence is 158 ms longer than in cleft (t = 11.78, p < 
0.001). The duration differences (14% of the verb to noun window) make comparing 
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averages in word regions between simple and cleft less optimal. Therefore we did a 
fixed window analysis to compare simple with cleft sentences.  
Analysis of eye-movements: main analysis 
Fixations that landed within the coordinates of the target and competitor are analysed 
against key time periods in the audio stimuli. Fixations that landed within the 
coordinates of two distractors and the image of the person are also extracted. Any 
fixations deemed invalid due to blinking or head movements were removed. Any 
fixations shorter than 80 milliseconds were excluded, as extremely short fixations are 
often due to false saccade planning (Rayner & Pollatsek, 1989). Table 3 shows the 
percentages of fixations to each area of interest against all fixations across different 
word regions. 
We are interested in the anticipatory looks to the target compared to the 
competitor during the period following the verb. Thus, we calculated the probability of 
looks to the target and competitor as a function of time, using the log-ratio measure: 
Ln(Ptarget/Pcompetitor). Ptarget refers to the proportion of looks to target image, and Pcompetitor 
refers to the proportion of looks to the competitor image6. “Ln” is the natural 
logarithm7. The measure is symmetrical around zero such that a bias towards the target 
is reflected in a positive log-ratio score and a bias towards the competitor is reflected in 
a negative log-ratio score.  A log-ratio of 0 shows that there is an equal probability of 
looks to the target and competitor objects. This single ‘target advantage’ DV therefore 
provides a direct comparison between looks to the target versus competitor and was 
chosen based on related research that has used similar methods (Arnold, Eisenband, 
Brown-Schmidt, & Trueswell, 2000; Brown-Schmidt, Gunlogson, & Tanenhaus, 2008; 
Ferguson, Scheepers, & Sanford, 2010; Ferguson & Breheny, 2011, 2012; Heller, 
Grodner, & Tannenhaus, 2008). 
 
18 
Figure 1 (simple) and Figure 2 (cleft) plot the target advantage score over each 
17ms sample (the eye tracker runs at 60Hz), from the onset of the verb to the end of the 
sentence. With regard to the example sentence “(It is) Matt (who) hasn’t shut his dad’s 
window”, the figures cover before, during and after the section “shut his dad’s 
window”. The regions are named as verb, [pause], his, someone’s, and noun. In these 
graphs, vertical lines represent the average onsets and offsets of key regions. However, 
for calculations of percentage of looks and statistical tests, word regions for each 
sentence is defined by the onsets and offsets of words for that particular sentence. Note 
that for all plots and data analysis, word regions have been offset by 200ms, as it takes 
around 200ms to launch an eye-movement (Hallett, 1986). As sentences differ in their 
onsets and offsets of words, the curves in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are resynchronized at 
the onset of each word, so that the graph more accurately reflects the evolving visual 
biases relative to the audio stimuli (Altmann & Kamide, 2009). The 500ms pre-verb 
window is synced to the onset of the verb. 
(Figure 1 about here).  
(Figure 2 about here).  
We averaged the target advantage scores in key regions both by participant and 
by item. Statistical tests are applied on these average target advantage scores. Note that 
both Ptarget and Pcompetitor have a distribution over a closed interval of [0,1]. When either 
measurement is 0, it is a problem for log transformation. In this case, we transformed 0 
values using the function y’ = [y(N – 1) + s]/N (Smithson & Verkuilen, 2006, see 
supplementary material). Y’ is the transformed value, y is the original value.  N is the 
sample size and s is a constant between 0 and 1. From a Bayesian point of view, s acts 
as if we are taking a prior into account. 0.5 is recommended as a reasonable choice for 
s. This function “squeezes” the values into an open interval (0,1). 
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Let us inspect the results in the Figures. Here we focus on the target advantage 
scores between the offset of the verb and the offset of the noun. During and before the 
verb region, no difference between looks to the target and the competitor was expected 
or observed (see percentages of looks in Table 3 and t-test statistics in Table 4). The low 
proportion of looks to the target and the competitor in the early regions (<15%) meant 
that small fluctuations in the percentages of looks could lead to large fluctuations in 
target advantage scores. Note that initial analyses examine the time course of effects 
separately for simple and cleft sentences due to differences in the length of word-based 
time-regions of analysis (i.e. the verb and post-verb silence are approximately 200 ms 
longer in the simple versus cleft sentences). 
For simple sentences (Figure 1) there is a difference between positive and 
negative conditions from the offset of the verb onwards. For positives, a bias towards 
the target was formed immediately after the verb. For negatives, however, there are 
roughly equal amount of looks to the target and the competitor after the verb, in the 
post-verb silence and “his” regions. A target bias did develop later, crucially before the 
onset of the noun (during “someone’s”). A 3 (region: post-verb silence and “his” vs. 
“someone’s” vs. noun) by 2 (polarity: positive vs. negative) ANOVA shows that there is 
no significant region by polarity interaction F1(2,70) = 1.17, p = 0.32, ηp2 = 0.03; 
F2(2,76) = 0.28, p = 0.76, ηp2 = 0.007. However, there is a significant main effect of 
region: F1(2,70) = 3.54, p = 0.04, ηp2 = 0.03;  F2(2,76) = 5.74, p = 0.005, ηp2 = 0.13 
(reflecting increasing looks to the target over time), and importantly, a highly 
significant main effect of polarity: F1(1,35) = 32.03, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.49; F2(1,38) = 
13.57, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.26. This suggests that participants were consistently more 
likely to fixate the target (versus the competitor) following a positive sentence 
compared to a negative sentence from the verb offset to the noun offset. We then 
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performed planned paired-sampled t-tests to compare positive and negative conditions 
using the target advantage scores in the verb and post-verb regions (see Table 4). 
Results show that the difference between positive and negative conditions is significant 
in the post-verb silence and “his”, “someone’s”, and the noun region.  
In the case of cleft sentences (Figure 2), there is no difference between positive 
and negative conditions from the offset of the verb to the onset of the noun. In this 
period, participants were paying comparable attention to the target and the competitor. 
A 3 (region: post-verb silence and “his” vs. “someone’s” vs. noun) by 2 (polarity: 
positive vs. negative) ANOVA shows that there is no significant region by polarity 
interaction F1(2,70) = 1.17, p = 0.32, ηp2 = 0.03; F2(2,76) = 0.74, p = 0.48, ηp2 = 0.02, 
however, there is a significant main effect of region: F1(2,70) = 3.54, p = 0.04, ηp2 = 
0.03;  F2(2,76) = 12.0, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.24 (again showing increasing looks to the 
target over time). Crucially, unlike the simple condition, here polarity does not have a 
significant main effect (though trending by participants): F1(1,35) = 3.89, p < 0.06, ηp2 = 
0.10; F2(1,38) = 1.04, p = 0.31, ηp2 = 0.027. Planned paired sampled t-tests on target 
advantage scores (see Table 4) show that there is no difference between positive and 
negative conditions during the post-verb silence and “his”, or “someone’s”. In the noun 
region, the difference is significant by subjects only.   
Thus, comparing simple and cleft sentences, between the offset of the verb and 
the onset of the noun, there is a difference between positive and negative conditions for 
simple but not cleft sentences. In order to test whether this interactive pattern between 
sentence types is significant, we need to extract a fixed length window from the offset 
of the verb for both simple and cleft sentences. This is because the post-verb silence 
region for cleft is shorter than that for simple by 160ms, thus regions defined by word 
boundaries are not ideal for comparison between simple and cleft. We therefore 
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extracted a 449ms window from the offset of verb for all items. This is the shortest gap 
between the offset of the verb and the onset of the noun among all items. As before, we 
calculated the average target advantage score (i.e. proportion of looks to the target over 
competitor) in the post-verb 449ms window. We performed a 2 (cleftness: simple vs. 
cleft) by 2 (polarity: positive vs. negative) ANOVA, which shows that there is a 
significant cleftness by polarity interaction over this time period, F1(1,35) = 8.19, p = 
0.007, ηp2 = 0.19; F2(1,38) = 6.16, p = 0.018, ηp2 = 0.14. Paired sample t-tests show that 
there is a highly significant difference between simple positive and negative: t1(35) = 
4.53, p = 6.6e-05, t2(35) =3.02, p = 0.004; but no difference between cleft positive and 
negative:  t1(35) = 0.24, p = 0.81, t2(35) = 0.49, p = 0.63. 
Finally, in order to determine whether there are significantly more looks to the 
target than the competitor, i.e. whether the average target advantage score is 
significantly greater than zero, we performed planned one-sampled t-tests comparing 
target advantage scores to zero for each of the four word-based regions (verb, post-verb 
silence and “his”, “someone’s”, and noun; Table 5). Results show that for simple 
sentences, positive conditions elicit a significant bias to the target immediately after the 
verb, while in negative conditions, the bias to the target only becomes significant in the 
“noun” region. For cleft sentences, positive and negative conditions show similar 
patterns: there is a bias to the target during “someone’s” region (significant by subject 
only for cleft negative) and the noun region. 
(Table 3 about here).  
(Table 4 about here). 
(Table 5 about here).  
Time-course analysis  
In order to determine exactly when a target bias was established, we conducted a time-
 
22 
course analysis on a one-second time period from the offset of the verb. We divided this 
period into ten 100ms time slices, and calculated a target advantage score for each time 
point and condition. Figure 3 and Figure 4 plot the averaged target advantage scores for 
10 time slices from the offset of verb, for simple sentences and cleft sentences 
respectively. They show that shortly after the verb (in the first 5 slices), target 
advantage scores differ greatly between simple positives and negative, but are almost 
identical between cleft positive and negative. Later on (from slice 6 onwards), target 
advantage scores for positive and negative sentences differ in both the simple condition 
and the cleft condition.  We performed a 10 (time bin) by 2 (cleftness: simple vs. cleft) 
by 2 (polarity: positive vs. negative) ANOVA, which showed a time by clefting by 
polarity interaction (significant by participants): F1(9,315) = 2.8, p = 0.04, ηp2= 0.074; 
F2(9,342) = 1.54, p = 0.20, ηp2= 0.04. To investigate this further we conducted separate 
10 (time bin) by 2 (polarity: positive vs. negative) ANOVAs for simple sentences and 
cleft sentences. Here, simple sentences showed a significant time by polarity 
interaction: F1(9,315) = 2.42, p = 0.036, ηp2 = 0.45; F2(9,342)=2.47, p = 0.03, ηp2 = 
0.43, however the time by polarity interaction was not significant for cleft sentences 
(but showed a trend by participants): F1(9,315) = 2.22, p = 0.053, ηp2 = 0.43; F2(9,342) 
= 1.09, p = 0.4, ηp2 = 0.25. 
To determine the point at which a reliable target bias was formed, we performed 
one-sampled t-tests comparing target advantage scores with zero for each time slice 
(Table 6, reporting both the original p values and the Šidák corrected p values ). Results 
show that for simple positive sentences, the target bias was significant from 200ms after 
the offset of the verb. For simple negatives, the target bias has trending significance 
only in the 10th time slice (see Figure 3). For cleft sentences, the target bias becomes 
significant in the 6th time slice for cleft positives (trending in the 5th). For cleft 
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negatives, the target bias is significant by subject in the 6th and 7th slices and 
significant by item in the 9th slice (see Figure 4). The results further demonstrate the 
difference in processing time between simple positive and negative, and the lack of 
difference in processing time between cleft positive and negative.   
(Table 6 about here). 
(Figure 3 about here). 
(Figure 4 about here). 
General Discussion 
This study shows that shortly after the verb in simple negative sentences like “Matt 
hasn’t shut his dad’s window”, participants paid comparable attention to both the image 
consistent with the content of the positive counterpart (a shut window) and the image 
consistent with the negative sentence meaning (an open window). This suggests that 
when processing simple negative sentences, the content of the positive counterpart is 
initially activated. One might argue that the initial lack of difference between looks to 
the target and the competitor in the simple negative condition was due to participants 
looking randomly at the two pictures, i.e. they never activated the positive argument. 
However, as many previous studies have found that the positive argument is often 
initially activated during negation processing, our interpretation is more plausible. 
However, within 900ms from the offset of the verb (in the noun region), participants 
had shifted their attention away from the positive content, and focused on the negation-
consistent representation. In comparison, when hearing a simple positive sentence like 
“Matt has shut his dad’s window”, participants favoured the target representation (shut 
window) immediately from verb offset.  
In the case of cleft sentences, bias to an image consistent with the sentence 
content forms at the same rate for negative and positive cases. When hearing either a 
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positive or negative cleft sentence, participants pay comparable attention to both the 
target and the competitor representation after the verb.  For cleft positives, a target bias 
became significant at around 500ms after the offset of the verb, and for cleft negatives, 
it took around 600ms. Participants’ attention shifted away from the competitor and onto 
the target in “dad’s” region (as in “his dad’s window”), before the onset of noun. The 
time-course of the processing of cleft negatives is very similar to cleft positives. As 
predicted, Cleft sentences of both polarities experienced some delay compared to the 
simple positive sentence, due to the greater complexity of the situational context and the 
possible presence of a conversational implicature arising from the cleft construction. 
Comparing results from simple and cleft sentences, there is a difference between 
simple but not cleft sentences, as demonstrated by the significant polarity-by-cleftness 
interaction in the 449 ms post-verb window. What’s more, despite the fact that cleft 
negatives are linguistically and pragmatically more complex than simple negatives, the 
formation of the target bias did not take longer in cleft negatives than simple negatives. 
These results suggest that the processing delay in simple negatives is not in fact caused 
by the first step of negation processing. Rather, it is likely due to QUD accommodation. 
Without context or further cues, the most prominent QUD for a simple negative 
sentence is whether the positive counterpart is true, e.g. whether Matt has shut his dad’s 
window. Accommodating this QUD results in the representation of content consistent 
with the positive counterpart. In contrast, a cleft negative sentence has a negative 
prominent QUD, such as who hasn’t shut their dad’s window. The representation of this 
QUD is congruent with the representation of the sentence meaning. Similarly, a cleft 
positive sentence has a positive prominent QUD, such as who has shut their dad’s 
window, which is also congruent with the representation of the sentence meaning. 
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Therefore, the timecourse of bias formation for a negative cleft sentence is no more 
delayed than that for a positive cleft sentence. 
Evaluation of current results against rejection accounts 
Our results are incompatible with rejection accounts in at least three predictions. First, 
according to rejection accounts, we should see that for both simple negative and cleft 
negative sentences the formation of a bias to the target is delayed compared to their 
positive counterparts, given that both types of negative sentence express the same 
proposition. Instead, we saw that only simple negatives are delayed compared to their 
positive counterparts. Second, rejection accounts should predict that when processing a 
negative sentence participants FIRST represent content consistent with the positive 
counterpart and then represent the state of affairs consistent with sentence meaning. 
Instead, we saw that when hearing a simple negative sentence, participants paid 
comparable attention to both the representation for the positive counterpart and the 
negation consistent representation, before shifting attention away from the positive-
counterpart representation. This suggests that representation of the positive-counterpart 
content is not a discrete first step, but happens in parallel with representing the sentence 
meaning. Third, rejection accounts predict that the meaning of negation is incorporated 
after the positive argument is processed8. However, our results for cleft negatives 
suggest that the meaning of negation can be incorporated incrementally. A target bias 
was formed just 600ms after the offset of the verb, before the onset of noun. The time-
course is similar to cleft positives. This suggests that participants start combining the 
meaning of negation with the verb as soon as they hear the verb, namely “not shut” 
implies “open”. This information is then used to infer the shape/state of the target 
object, and direct their visual attention to the object that is compatible with the 
combined meaning of the negation, the verb and the noun.  
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The representation of the positive content 
Coming back to the literature on the activation of the content of the positive counterpart 
during negative sentence processing, our results for simple negative sentences support 
previous findings that the positive-counterpart content can be activated in the early 
stage of negative sentence processing. The early occurrence of this representation 
supports the idea that QUD accommodation happens incrementally during sentence 
processing.  
In terms of the duration of the activation of the positive content, in our visual 
world paradigm, it lasted for around 800ms - 900ms. This duration is compatible with 
the findings of Hasson and Glucksberg (2006) as well as Kaup, Lüdtke and Zwaan 
(2006).  
Our results also show that the activation of the positive-counterpart content is 
not a discrete first step, but happens in parallel with the activation of sentence-meaning 
consistent representation. The results from most other studies have no support for this. 
They generally found higher accessibility of the positive content than the negation-
consistent representation during the early stages. How can we reconcile our results with 
these findings? In our paradigm all potential representations are visually present on the 
screen. Without such visual stimuli, it is highly likely that representing the state of 
affairs consistent with the negative sentence takes longer than representing the positive 
content, as the former involves an extra inferential step. For example, to form a 
representation based on the stimulus, “the window is not open”, participants must infer 
that the window is closed and represent such a state, whereas to form a representation 
for, “the window is open”, no additional inference is required beyond access to the 
meanings of the predicates. Thus, in paradigms where representations are not shown in 
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advance, participants may first arrive at the representation of the QUD since the positive 
content is easier to access.  
Overall our data in simple sentences support previous findings that the positive-
counterpart content can be activated during negation processing.  
Implications 
The current study presents the first exploration of negation processing using a visual 
world paradigm that allows us to track the time-course of inferences based on positive 
and negative framed statements. Moreover, it provides an extension of previous work 
(Tian et al., 2010) to establish how sentence structure, specifically manipulating 
sentence focus using clefts, influences language processing and facilitates 
representation of the negated argument. Beyond the processing of negation, this study 
relates to the broader question of how pragmatic information is incrementally updated 
during sentence processing. Research has grown in the online integration of pragmatic 
information. For example, we can integrate common ground and the speaker’s epistemic 
state at the earliest moment and use such information to predict upcoming referents 
(Breheny et al., 2013; Heller et al., 2008); we can access scalar implicatures on-line 
with little or no delay (Breheny, Ferguson, & Katsos, 2012; Grodner, Klein, Carbary, & 
Tanenhaus, 2010); we can infer information about the speaker using accents and 
cultural heuristics, and use it to anticipate upcoming words in a sentence (van Berkum, 
van den Brink, Tesink, Kos, & Hagoort, 2008). However, as far as we know, there have 
been no prior studies in the online accommodation of QUD. We have shown that the 
linguistic form of a sentence contains cues for how it is related to the prior context. On 
hearing or reading a sentence when there is insufficient or no context, comprehenders 
do not just process the semantic meaning of a sentence, rather, they also use cues to 
infer and accommodate a likely context, specifically a QUD. This process is automatic 
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and incremental. Negation is one such cue for retrieving a prominent QUD. Without 
other cues (such as cleft construction), the most prominent QUD for a negative sentence 
is positive. This is why studies often report the representation of the positive- 
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 “Positive” and “affirmative” are used interchangeably in this paper. We use “argument 
of negation” to refer to the semantic, conceptual content of the affirmative counterpart 
of the sentence containing the negative element, “not”. 
2 See Geurts (2010) for a discussion of implicatures derived from presuppositions. 
3 But note that other visual-world studies report a delay in access to implicatures see 
(Tomlinson et al., 2013). 
4 We didn’t use adjectives gap fillers such as “Matt has/hasn’t shut the bright new 
window”, because adjectives (bright new) often imply visual qualities, which can be 
used to identify the target. In addition, adjective-noun phrases are often used 
contrastively, implying a salient alternative with different qualities. This will make the 
sentences less felicitous against our visual scenes. 
5 We did not instruct the speaker to insert a post-verb silence. It occurred from natural 
reading. 
6 Please see the Appendix 2 for plots showing the “raw” probability values, separately 
for target and competitor. 
7 The log correction is applied since fixation proportions are bounded by 0 and 1. 
8 It is worth noting that the rejection account proposed by Clark and Chase (1972) and 
Carpenter and Just (1975) was devised in the period before ‘real-time’ incremental 











Appendix 1. Experimental sentences 
All experimental sentences appear in four conditions: simple positive, simple negative, 
cleft positive and cleft negative. For example: 
Simple positive: Anna has closed her mom’s umbrella. 
Simple negative: Anma hasn’t closed her mom’s umbrella.  
Cleft positive: It is Anna who has closed her mom’s umbrella. 
Cleft negative: It is Anna hasn’t closed her mom’s umbrella. 
The following list are shown in simple negative format. 
Anna hasn't closed her mom's umbrella. 
Daniel hasn't emptied his mum's saucepan.  
Dave hasn't cleaned his wife's wellies. 
Grant hasn't sliced his chef's cucumber.  
John hasn't ironed his father's shirt. 
John hasn't opened his friend's book. 
John hasn't turned off his uncle's TV. 
Matt hasn't shut his dad's window. 
Mike hasn't folded his wife's scarf. 
Aiden hasn't washed his dad's car. 
Edward hasn't turned on his friend's tap. 
Gavin hasn't opened his son's can.  
Jim hasn't opened his friend's padlock. 
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Mary hasn't folded her friend's deck chair. 
Sophie hasn't closed her sister's drawer. 
Tina hasn't emptied her mom's jug. 
Tracy hasn't sliced her mom's bread. 
Amy hasn't finished her cousin's jigsaw puzzle. 
Andrew hasn't lit his auntie's candle. 
Ben hasn't broken his friend's pencil.  
Bill hasn't tied his son's shoe laces. 
Chris hasn't fastened his son's zip. 
Dave hasn't peeled his sister's banana. 
Emma hasn't rolled up her son's sleeves. 
Ian hasn't cooked his sister's spaghetti. 
James hasn't blown up his cousin's balloon. 
James hasn't inflated his brother's tyre. 
Jessica hasn't picked up her husband's phone. 
Justin hasn't erased his teacher's blackboard.  
Lee hasn't sealed his boss's envelope. 
Lilly hasn't cracked her sister's egg. 
Linda hasn't iced her auntie's cupcake.  
Lucas hasn't turned off his wife's light bulb. 
Lucy hasn't framed her sister's photo.   
Nathan hasn't emptied his colleague's truck.  
Nick hasn't decorated his friend's Christmas tree. 
Paul hasn't dried his auntie's tomatoes.  
Rita hasn't screwed up her sister's wrapping paper.  
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Susan hasn't mended her son's jeans.  
Susan hasn't rolled up her friend's yoga mat. 
Zoey hasn't cut her sister's cake. 
Appendix 2. Figures showing proportions of looks to the target and the competitor 
separately, for simple and cleft conditions.  
Figure Appendix  2a here 
 



















10 Anna has closed her mom's umbrella. 
hasn't 10 Matt hasn't shut his dad's window. 
has 
cleft 
10 It is James who has blown up his cousin's balloon. 




simple 5 Bob will chop his father's wood. 
cleft 5 Andrew will ride his father's horse. 
should 
have 
simple 5 Bill has wrapped the birthday present. 
cleft 5 




simple 10 Eva shouldn't have scratched her brother's CD. 
cleft 10 It is Betty who shouldn't have cut her friend's rope. 





Table 2. Average word lengths in milliseconds for key regions 
Average word 




his/her someone's noun 
Simple 
     
          Has 504 222 169 424 546 
          Hasn’t 501 151 169 441 577 
Cleft 
               Has 438 10 174 420 549 





Table 3. Proportion of looks to target, competitor, person and distractors for all 
conditions in key regions. The numbers for distractors correspond to the summed 
percentage of looks to both distractors. 





target 0.13 0.25 0.32 0.35 
competitor 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.16 
target & competitor Total 0.26 0.38 0.45 0.51 
person 0.29 0.2 0.16 0.14 
distractors 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.16 
Simple Negative 
target 0.15 0.21 0.27 0.32 
competitor 0.11 0.21 0.2 0.2 
target & competitor Total 0.26 0.42 0.47 0.52 
person 0.28 0.19 0.18 0.14 
distractors 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.16 
Cleft Positive 
target 0.13 0.14 0.24 0.38 
competitor 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.16 
target & competitor Total 0.25 0.29 0.41 0.54 
person 0.3 0.28 0.23 0.14 
distractors 0.29 0.25 0.2 0.15 
Cleft Negative 
target 0.14 0.2 0.26 0.31 
competitor 0.15 0.2 0.19 0.19 
target & competitor Total 0.29 0.4 0.45 0.5 
person 0.24 0.23 0.17 0.13 








Table 4. Paired sample t-tests on target advantage scores between positive and negative. 
Asterisks in this table and the rest of the paper indicate levels of significance based on p 
values corrected for multiple comparisons. * for p<0.05, ** for p<0.01, and *** for 
p<0.001. 
 By subject  By item 
Simple df t1 p (2-tailed) 
 
df t2 p (2-tailed) 
     verb 35 0.89 0.38  38 0.75 0.46 
     SIL&his 35 3.20** 0.003 
 
38 2.195* 0.03 
     someone’s 35 4.52*** 6.8E-05 
 
38 2.995** 0.005 
     noun 35 3.26** 0.003 
 
38 2.435* 0.02 
Cleft 
       
     verb 35 0.71 0.48  38 0.53 0.60 
     SIL&his 35 0.40 0.69 
 
38 0.026 0.98 
     someone’s 35 0.21 0.84 
 
38 1.226 0.23 
     noun 35 3.22** 0.003 
 












Table 5. One sample t-test comparing target advantage scores with zero on all 
conditions. 





Simple  df t1 p (2-tailed)  df t2 p (2-tailed) 
A verb 35 0.28 0.78  38 0.22 0.83 
 SIL & his 35 4.54*** 6.4E-05  38 3.34** 0.002 
 someone's 35 7.08*** 3.0E-08  38 6.20*** 3.0E-07 
 noun 35 4.86*** 2.5E-05  38 5.59*** 2.1E-06 
N verb 35 1.62 0.11  38 1.37 0.18 
 SIL & his 35 0.18 0.858  38 0.58 0.57 
 someone's 35 0.92 0.364  38 1.88 0.07 
 noun 35 3.15** 0.003  38 3.15** 0.003 
Cleft         
A verb 35 0.16 0.87  38 0.14 0.89 
 SIL & his 35 0.19 0.85  38 0.5 0.61 
 
someone's 35 2.63* 0.01  38 2.49* 0.02 
 
noun 35 5.82*** 1.4E-06 
 
38 6.17*** 3.3E-07 
N verb 35 1.50 0.14  38 0.68 0.50 
 
SIL & his 35 0.37 0.715 
 
38 0.61 0.54 
 
someone's 35 3.03** 0.005 
 
38 1.61 0.12 
 
noun 35 3.20** 0.003 
 








Table 6. One sample t-test comparing target advantage scores with zero in 100ms time 







By subject  
   
By item 
 










A 1 35 1.10 0.28 1  38 0.75 0.46 1 
 
2 35 3.17* 3.1E-03 0.03  38 2.69 0.01 0.10 
 
3 35 5.81*** 1.4E-06 1.3E-05  38 5.07*** 1.0E-05 1.0E-04 
 
4 35 5.87*** 1.1E-06 1.1E-05  38 5.26*** 5.5E-06 5.3E-05 
 
5 35 5.63*** 2.4E-06 2.3E-05  38 5.24*** 5.8E-06 5.7E-05 
 
6 35 5.88*** 1.1E-06 1.1E-05  38 5.04*** 1.1E-05 1.1E-04 
 
7 35 5.69*** 2.0E-06 1.9E-05  38 5.94*** 6.8E-07 6.7E-06 
 
8 35 5.89*** 1.1E-06 1.1E-05  38 6.07*** 4.6E-07 4.5E-06 
 
9 35 5.33*** 5.9E-06 5.8E-05  38 5.07*** 1.1E-05 1.0E-04 
  10 35 5.41*** 4.6E-06 4.5E-05  38 5.38*** 4.0E-06 3.9E-05 
N 1 35 0.63 0.54 1  38 0.13 0.90 1 
 
2 35 0.58 0.57 1  38 1.16 0.25 1 
 
3 35 0.98 0.33 1  38 0.95 0.35 1 
 
4 35 0.72 0.47 1  38 0.65 0.52 1 
 
5 35 0.33 0.74 1  38 0.49 0.62 1 
 
6 35 1.07 0.29 1  38 1.79 0.08 0.78 
 
7 35 1.03 0.31 1  38 2.04 0.05 0.49 
 
8 35 1.52 0.14 1  38 2.78 0.01 0.10 
 
9 35 2.03 0.05 0.49  38 2.44 0.02 0.2 
  10 35 2.65 0.01 0.10  38 2.85 0.007 0.07 
Cleft 
 
    
 
   
 
A 1 35 0.61 0.54 1  38 0.75 0.46 1 
 
2 35 0.84 0.40 1  38 0.05 0.96 1 
 
3 35 1.10 0.28 1  38 0.73 0.47 1 
 
4 35 1.09 0.28 1  38 0.94 0.35 1 
 
5 35 2.87 0.007 0.07  38 2.80 8.0E-03 0.08 
 
6 35 4.07*** 2.0E-04 0.002  38 3.48* 1.0E-03 0.01 
 
7 35 5.31*** 6.2E-06 6.1E-05  38 4.33** 1.1E-04 0.001 
 
8 35 5.57*** 2.9E-06 2.8E-05  38 5.15*** 8.3E-06 8.1E-05 
 
9 35 6.17*** 4.6E-07 4.5E-06  38 5.41*** 3.7E-06 3.6E-05 
 
47 
  10 35 5.96*** 8.8E-07 8.6E-06  38 4.86*** 2.0E-05 2.0E-04 
N 1 35 0.30 0.77 1  38 0.24 0.81 1 
 
2 35 0.45 0.65 1  38 1.07 0.29 1 
 
3 35 1.53 0.14 1  38 -0.04 0.97 1 
 
4 35 1.85 0.07 0.68  38 0.48 0.63 1 
 
5 35 2.43 0.02 0.2  38 1.43 0.16 1 
 
6 35 3.52** 1.2E-03 0.01  38 2.23 0.03 0.29 
 
7 35 3.81** 5.3E-04 0.005  38 2.08 0.04 0.39 
 
8 35 2.37 0.02 0.2  38 2.32 0.03 0.29 
 
9 35 2.41 0.02 0.2  38 3.25* 0.002 0.02 




Figure 1. Target advantage scores for positive and negative conditions – simple 
 
Figure 2. Target advantage scores for positive and negative conditions – cleft 
 
Figure 3. Average target advantage scores in 100 time slices from the offset of verb - 
Simple. 
 
Figure 4. Average target advantage scores in 100 time slices from the offset of verb - 
Cleft. 
 
Figure Appendix 2a. Proportions of looks to the target and the competitor_simple 
Condition 
 
Figure Appendix 2b. Proportions of looks to the target and the competitor_cleft 
condition 
 
